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Miller v. Northside Danzi Construction
Company: Immunity, the Contractor-Under
Clause and Alaska's Workers' Compensation Act
In Miller v. Northside Danzi Construction Co.," the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a general contractor," required by
Alaska's Workers' Compensation Act' to pay compensation to an
uninsured subcontractor's injured employee, is not immune from
liability at common law for the same injuries. Interpreting nar-
rowly the Act's "employer" definition,4 the court prohibited the
1. 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(f) (1981) defines "contractor": "[A] person who under-
takes by contract performance of certain work for another .... " The party this defini-
tion identifies is the general contractor in the typical general contractor-subcontractor
relationship. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970). The Alaska Workers' Com-
pensation Act defines a "subcontractor" as "a person to whom a contractor sublets all or
part of his initial undertaking." ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(f) (1981). The Thorsheim
court, attempting to give substance to these skeletal definitions, stated:
From these definitions it follows that a person who has not incurred a contrac-
tual duty cannot properly be deemed a contractor under our statute. Similarly,
if a person enters into a contract to perform work, he cannot be construed to
be a subcontractor unless the duty which he undertakes is at the same time
part of a contractual duty of the party with whom he contracted.
Thorsheim, 469 P.2d at 389.
The general contractor may occupy any position in a hierarchy of contractors, yet
remain within the parameters of the Act's definitions. For example, where a building
project consists of a general or "prime" contractor, a subcontractor, and a sub-subcon-
tractor, the subcontractor acts as general contractor over the sub-subcontractor. See
Preface: Traditional Relationships On the Building Project, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205,
212 (1979). The existence of this hierarchy has no effect on the liability examined in this
casenote provided that, wherever the contractor stands in that hierarchy, he has (1)
incurred a contractual duty and (2) has sublet all or part of that work to another. Of
course, where such a hierarchy exists, and the injured employee's primary employer is
uninsured, courts generally limit compensation liability examined herein to the first
insured contractor above the primary employer whose employee is injured. See In re Van
Bibber's Case, 343 Mass. 433, 448, 179 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1962); 1C A. LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 49.11, 44.11, at 9-13 (1980). Therefore, for purposes of this
casenote, the party incurring the contractual obligation is referred to as the general con-
tractor and the party to whom the general contractor sublets all or part of his work is
referred to as the subcontractor. Moreover, two additional assumptions are that a gen-
eral contractor-subcontractor relationship exists, and that an employer-employee rela-
tionship exists between the injured worker and the subcontractor.
3. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-.270 (1981 & Supp. 1981).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265 (1981) defines "employer" and "employee":
In this chapter
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general contractor from asserting the exclusive liability defense5
granted to the primary employer who pays compensation to its
injured employee, and thus permitted the injured worker to
claim awards under the Act and independently at common law.
By allowing the injured employee recovery from the contractor
on both statutory no fault6 and negligence. grounds the court
upset the balance created by the Act's compensation scheme,
created internal inconsistencies in the Act's wording, and forced
(11) "employee" means an employee employed by an employer as defined in
paragraph (12);
(12) "employer" means a state or its political subdivision or a person employ-
ing one or more persons in connection with a business or industry coming
within the scope of this chapter and carried on in this state;
This casenote distinguishes between two types of employers. First, the primary
employer is the party with whom the worker's direct beneficial employment relationship
exists. The primary employer is generally the wage payer and the person who determines
the scope of the worker's duties and the method of their performance. Depending upon
the jurisdiction, the determination that a primary employment relationship exists may
rely on tests looking to control of the worker or the nature of the work performed. The
relationship, however, is only created by a contract for hire, either express or implied.
Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc. v. Beukers, 554 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1976); Selid Constr. Co.
v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1960). That contract is the touchstone for
responsibility to secure compensation insurance. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.020 (1981). In this
casenote the relationship of subcontractor to the injured worker is that of primary
employer to employee.
The second type of employer is the "statutory employer." A statutory employer is
one who assumes the primary employer's responsibility to secure compensation coverage
because of a statutorily imposed duty, not by virtue of an employment relationship or a
contract for hire. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Act's contractor-under clause
imposes this type of duty. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. Liability under
that clause results from the general contractor-subcontractor relationship. Thorsheim v.
State, 469 P.2d 383, 389 (Alaska 1970). For purposes of this casenote, the general con-
tractor is a statutory employer.
5. The Act provides:
Exclusiveness of Liability. The liability of an employer prescribed in AS
23.30.045 is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any
fellow employee to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife,
parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from the employer or fellow employee at law or in admiralty on
account of the injury or death. However, if an employer fails to secure payment
of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee or his legal
representative in case death results from the injury may elect to claim compen-
sation under this chapter, or to maintain an action against the employer at law
or in admiralty for damages on account of the injury or death. In that action
the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the
negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee assumed the risk of his
employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the
employee.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(b) (1981) provides: "Compensation is payable irrespec-
tive of fault as a cause for the injury."
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distinction between parties who, for purposes of compensation
payments, should be equals.
Douglas Miller was an employee of Sweet & Sour Construc-
tion Company, a subcontractor of defendant general contractor,
Northside Danzi Construction Company. In the course of his
employment, Miller was electrocuted. Discovering that Sweet &
Sour had failed to secure workers' compensation coverage, dece-
dent's personal represeniative sought and received compensation
from Danzi pursuant to the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act.7
Miller's representative later instituted a negligence action,8
asserting that the compensation award did not preclude his pur-
suit of Danzi as a third-party tort feasor.9 The superior court
granted Danzi's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
general contractor's liability for the compensation award ren-
dered it immune from tort liability under the Act's exclusive lia-
bility clause. 0 On appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding
Danzi was potentially liable to the employee under both the
Workers' Compensation Act and in tort. The court reasoned
that the Act's history and language did not manifest a legislative
intent to include a "contractor" within the scope of the
"employer" definition merely by virtue of its duty to pay com-
pensation benefits to the subcontractor's injured employee. And,
since the Act explicitly grants exclusive liability only to
"employers," 11 a general contractor cannot assert the exclusive
liability provision in defense of the injured worker's tort claim.12
Danzi's liability to pay Miller's compensation benefits arose
7. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(a) (1981) provides:
An employer is liable for and shall secure the payment to his employee of the
compensation payable under AS 23.30.050, 23.30.095, 23.30.145, and 23.30.180-
23.30.215. If the employer is a subcontractor, the contractor is liable for and
shall secure the payment of the compensation to employees of the subcon-
tractor unless the subcontractor secures the payment.
(emphasis added). Since Miller's primary employer, Sweet & Sour Construction Com-
pany, was also an uninsured subcontractor, the Act required Danzi, the general contrac-
tor, to pay Miller's compensation benefits.
8. Plaintiff relied on ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(a) (1981) that provides:
If on account of disability or death for which compensation is payable under
this chapter the person entitled to the compensation believes that a third per-
son other than the employer or a fellow employee is liable for damages, he
need not elect whether to receive compensation or to recover from the third
person.
9. 629 P.2d at 1390.
10. Id.
11. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981). See supra note 5.
12. 629 P.2d at 1391.
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from the contractor-under clause of Alaska's Workers' Compen-
sation Act.13 Contractor-under clauses require a general contrac-
tor to pay workers' compensation benefits to an uninsured sub-
contractor's injured employee. 14 Two theories support these
provisions. First, the clause provides incentive for the general
contractor (the party in the best position to police the relation-
ship) to insist that the subcontractor secure compensation cover-
age for its employees. 5 Second, the clause prevents evasion of
the responsibility to provide compensation by those who would
subdivide their regular operations among smaller subcontractors
to escape primary employment relationships.1 " The goal is to
assure that all eligible workers enjoy coverage under the Act's
compensation scheme. The effect is to place the general contrac-
tor in the shoes of the workers' primary employer for purposes
of providing workers' compensation coverage,17 even though the
employment contract that activates the responsibility to secure
that coverage is nonexistent. The general contractor, instead,
becomes the worker's "statutory employer." Thus, in Miller the
injured worker received compensation, though his primary
employer was uninsured. Because Danzi conceded its liability to
pay Miller's compensation according to the Act, that liability
was not in issue. At issue was whether Danzi's status as
Miller's statutory employer rendered Danzi immune from addi-
tional liability in tort.
Alaska's Workers' Compensation Act provides tort immu-
nity for the employer who secures compensation payments for
his injured employee.19 Because liability for the payments arises
13. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(a) (1981). See supra note 7.
14. Forty-three states have contractor-under statutes. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW § 72.31, at 14-47 & n.46 (1976). The contractor-under provisions fall
into essentially three categories: those that place the sole or primary obligation to pro-
vide compensation coverage on the general contractor, regardless of the subcontractor's
ability to provide for it; those that impose joint primary responsibility on both general
contractor and subcontractor, but permit the worker to seek compensation from only
one; and those that impose a secondary obligation on the general contractor which arises
only if the subcontractor fails to provide coverage. See 1C id. § 49.11, at 9-2 (1980);
McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and
Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEX. L. REV. 389, 407-08 (1959). Alaska's contractor-under
provision is of the third type.
15. Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383, 386-87 (Alaska 1970) (citing 1C A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 49.11, 9-12 to -16 (1980).
16. Thorsheim, 469 P.2d at 387.
17. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.31, at 14-47 (1976).
18. 629 P.2d at 1390.
19. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981). See supra note 5.
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regardless of fault, immunity from tort liability serves as a
counter-balance.2 0 On one hand, the employee gains swift and
sure compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employ-
ment irrespective of fault; on the other, the employer receives
immunity from further damage liability at law regardless of
whether his negligence caused the injury.21 A third party, not
subject to the no fault liability, has no tort immunity even
though the worker previously recovered compensation under the
Act.22 By restricting the exclusive liability provision to primary
employers, the Miller court held that a statutory employer, also
subjected to the Act's absolute liability, can nonetheless be sued
independently in tort.2 3 The holding allows the injured worker
to pursue the general contractor as both an employer and a
third-party, a result, the court reasoned, consistent with the
Act's history.
Alaska's first state legislature revised the workers' compen-
sation laws in 1959.24 The pre-1959 Act contained no contractor-
under clause, placing the general contractor in the same position
as a third party under the Act.2 5 The prior act included the
employer's insurance carrier within the definition of "employer,"
20. Federal Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 413 (1969);
Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258, 259
(Alaska 1979). Aside from its offsetting benefits-the employee's certainty of compensa-
tion and the employer's freedom from the hazards of litigation-workers' compensation
laws are frequently justified on an additional ground: they provide a simple and inexpen-
sive remedy usually free from the litigation process. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore,
605 P.2d 426, 435 (Alaska 1979); A. MILLUS & W. GENTILE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW AND INSURANCE 23 (1976); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698 (substantial increase in litigation following
court's application of Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act's exclu-
sive liability provision was one cause of 1972 amendments to that act). No fault liability
is one way of providing a remedy free from the litigation process.
21. State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258, 259 (Alaska 1979).
22. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015 (1981 & Supp. 1981) sets out the scheme for third-
party liability. Under that scheme the injured employee need not elect to accept com-
pensation from his employer or pursue a third-party action. If the employee accepts
compensation, however, he must institute action against the third party within one year.
If he fails to bring an action, the Act automatically assigns the cause to the compensa-
tion paying employer. Where the employee's third-party action is successful, the
employer retains the right to set-off (reimbursement) to the extent of the compensation
the employee received. Litigation expenses and other costs are also subject to the set-off.
Id. § 23.30.015(g).
23. 629 P.2d at 1390-91.
24. For a discussion of the full scope of the 1959 amendments, see generally Miller
v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1981), and Gordon v. Burgess
Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1967).
25. Miller, 629 P.2d at 1390.
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rendering the carrier immune to the worker's tort claims.26 Most
significantly, however, it stated the limitation on the employer's
liability in terms of the employee's exclusive remedies.2 7 By stat-
ing the immunity in this way, the pre-statehood Act protected
the employer from tort actions by the compensated employee.
Because the Act also permitted the employee to pursue a third-
party action, where the third party and the employer were joint
tort feasors, the third party could potentially recover the
amount of his liability from the employer via an indemnification
action. The 1959 amendments changed each of these elements in
the Act.
The legislature patterned the new Act after the Federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.2 The
revisions set out the immunities in terms of the employer's
exclusive liabilities, rather than the employee's remedies. A sub-
sequent revision also brought the injured worker's co-employee
within the immunity.2' Moreover, the legislature removed the
employer's insurance carrier from the "employer" classifica-
tion.30 Finally, the legislature enacted the contractor-under
clause, imposing contractor liability when the subcontractor fails
to provide the required compensation coverage.31 The revisions
also expanded the employer's immunity by prohibiting
employee's tort claims and third-party indemnity actions." By
expanding the immunity to the worker's employer and fellow
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co.,
425 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Alaska 1967), the court stated: "[The legislature] repealed the
[pre-1959] Workmen's Compensation Act in its entirety and enacted 'a new Workmen's
Compensation Act patterned after the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act." Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82, 84 (Alaska 1975).
Accord Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970) (contractor-under statute taken
from Federal Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (FLHWCA));
Fischback & Moore of Alaska, Inc. v. Lynn, 453 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1969) (persuasive
authority found from federal court decisions interpreting similar modification-of-awards
statute in FLHWCA).
29. The current exclusive liability provision, ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981), con-
tinues to reflect these revisions.
30. The Act now subjects the employer's compensation insurance carrier to statu-
tory penalties for failure to make compensation payments. Id. § 23.30.155(e),(f) (Supp.
1981). The penalties provided are not, however, exclusive. Stafford v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds, Cooper v. Argonaut
Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976).
31. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045 (1981).
32. See State v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 619 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1980); Arctic Struc-
tures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
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employees and removing the insurance carrier from the
"employer" status, the legislature altered the immunity coverage
to include only claims arising out of the common employment.
3 3
The revised Act does not specifically define the position of the
general contractor, as statutory employer, regarding the
immunity.
The Miller court looked primarily to the nature of the Act's
revisions to determine the scope of the immunity clause.-4 The
court reasoned that because the legislature, at the time of the
revisions, considered both the "employer" definition and the
exclusive liability clause without specifically including the gen-
eral contractor in either, the omission evidenced the legislature's
intent to exclude it from both. 5 The court read the statute as
including only the primary employer within the "employer" defi-
nition. Since the immunity provision covered only the
"employer" and the injured worker's fellow employees, the court
prohibited the general contractor from asserting the immunity
in defense of the worker's independent action in tort.
By construing the Act only in light of the legislative revi-
sions the court ignored its previously recognized policy of look-
ing to the Act's purpose and policy for guidance when interpret-
ing the Act's terms.8 Moreover, the court failed to interpret the
33. Professor Larson somewhat halfheartedly recognizes the consistency of the fel-
low employee immunity rule set out in many compensation acts. 2A A. LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.20 (1976). The justification, he states, is based on a com-
promise of rights. Since the employee has given up his right to common law claims, he
should receive freedom from such claims where he is at fault. Id. § 72.20, at 14-39. The
theory, however, does not rest comfortably with the vertical hierarchy where immunity
follows liability, such that those in a collateral position not required to provide compen-
sation coverage are not in the same position as those, such as employers, who are so
required. Id. § 72.33, at 14-81. See generally Id. §§ 72.20-.34 (discussing immunity and
the "common employment" concept). Granting immunity without concurrent liability
would not further one of compensation act's ultimate goals: to provide a safe workplace.
Immunity without liability would only encourage recklessness.
34. 629 P.2d at 1391. The court stated: "In light of the history of the Alaska Work-
ers' Compensation Act, we see no manifest intent to include general contractors such as
Danzi within the scope of the exclusive liability provision of [ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055
(1981)1." Id.
35. 629 P.2d at 1391.
36. In Searfus v. Northern Gas Co., 472 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1970), the court properly
exercised its judicial responsibility to interpret the Act in light of the purpose and policy
underlying it. The court, faced with construing the "employee" definition, stated:
"Alaska's present compensation act treats some persons as 'employees' who are not ser-
vants and excludes some servants from the category of employee." Id. at 968. After con-
sidering the social philosophy responsible for the Act, the court determined that the
traditional common law definition of "servant" was too narrow to accord with the ration-
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Act's separate provisions in pari materia with its total compen-
sation scheme. The result-permitting the injured worker to
institute actions against the contractor both under the Act and
in tort-upsets the balances the Act strikes between the
employee's interests and the employer's liability. Considering
these factors, the soundness of the Miller decision is
questionable.
First, the court's decision contradicts the Act's underlying
policy. The Act's keystone is the balance struck between the
employer and the injured worker: 7 the employee exchanges his
right to actions at law for the guarantee of certain compensation
by his employer regardless of fault.88 Because the liability to pay
compensation is absolute, irrespective of fault, courts perceive
the exclusive liability provision as a method of assuring that the
burdens, imposed to carry out the Act's social goals,89 do not fall
ale of compensation acts. The court instead broadened the scope of that classification
and adopted the "relative nature of the work" test for determining employee status. Id.
at 969. The court, recognizing the limits of its holding and the need for continual judicial
shaping of the terms of the Act, stated further: "Designation of the precise boundaries
of, and the relevant factors involved in, the 'nature of the work test' must, absent legisla-
tive definition, await further development through judicial decision." Id. at 969-70. See
also Thorsheim v. State, 469 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1970) (court looked to purpose of Act to
determine definition of "contractor" and "subcontractor").
37. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
38. The liability that the employer is freed from includes statutory as well as com-
mon law liability. See, e.g., Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975) (Act
bars claim by spouse for loss of consortium); Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., Inc., 495
P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972) (Act bars claim under Defective Machinery Act [ALASKA STAT. §§
23.25.010-.040 (1981 & Supp. 1981)]). But cf. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska
1977) (intentional torts outside purview of Act).
39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Broadly speaking, courts uphold the
constitutionality of workers' compensation legislation as a valid exercise of a state's
police powers to protect society against accidental loss and to spread the cost of that loss
over society as a whole. See Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 422-23 (1923);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 239 (1916).
Though beyond the scope of this casenote, it is important to note the possibility that
courts may find the immunity provision to be not only a major element, but a critical
element in the constitutional validity of the compensation act. In New York Cent. R.R.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the Supreme Court stated:
Viewing the entire matter, it cannot be pronounced arbitrary and unreasonable
for the State to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of making a mod-
erate and definite compensation in money to every disabled employee, or in
case of death to those who were entitled to look to him for support, in lieu of
the common-law liability confined to cases of negligence.
Id. at 205. In an earlier decision the Court had stated:
While plaintiff in error is an employer, and cannot succeed without showing
that its constitutional rights as employer are infringed [by the compensation
act] . . . yet it is evident that the employer's exemption from liability . . . is
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on only one class of individuals. Consequently, courts generally
deny relief where a claim seeks to override the statutory immu-
nity, and tip the balance to favor one side in the Act's
application."'
Second, the Miller holding applies the employer definition
inconsistently. The Act provides the employer with the right to
set off, out of a third-party award, any compensation it paid to
the injured employee."' The right, however, like the exclusive
liability provision, is in the "employer" as defined by the Act.
an essential part of the legislative scheme and the quid pro quo for the bur-
dens imposed upon him, so that if the act is not valid as against employees it is
not valid as against employers.
Mountain Timber, 243 U.S. at 234. Accord Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 502 (1923); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152,
163 (1919). See also Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 437-38 (Alaska
1979); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (quoting State v. Wylie, 516
P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973)). If the balance struck by the Act's provisions for absolute
and exclusive liability is essential to the validity of the Act, then the Miller court's deci-
sion denying the compensation paying general contractor the benefit of the immunity is
not only unsound, but impermissible.
40. See, e.g., State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979) (exclusive liability provision
bars action for separate tort under "dual capacity" doctrine); Wright v. Action Vending
Co., 544 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1975) (exclusive liability provision bars action by wife of injured
employee for loss of consortium); Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602 (Alaska
1967) (exclusive liability provision precludes recovery under Defective Machinery Act
[ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.25.010-.040 (1981 & Supp. 1981)]). But cf. Reed v. The Yaks, 373
U.S. 410 (1963) (where injured worker's employer is also shipowner, worker is not barred
from seeking damages under seaworthiness doctrine in addition to compensation under
FLHWCA); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (ship-
owner who is assessed damages under seaworthiness doctrine's absolute liability rule is
not barred from seeking indemnification from concurrently negligent stevedore under
FLHWCA); Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976) (subcontractor may
waive exclusive liability defense by express contractual agreement to indemnify general
contractor). In Reed and Ryan, the Supreme Court was compelled to invade the
FLHWCA's exclusive liability provision because of the inequity resulting from the ship-
owners' absolute liability under the seaworthiness doctrine. The majority in Ryan
stressed the fact that "the [FLHWCA] prescribes no quid pro quo for a shipowner that is
compelled to pay a judgment against it" by virtue of its absolute liability. Ryan, 330 U.S.
at 129. Before 1972, courts uniformly limited both Reed and Ryan to cases arising within
the context of the seaworthiness doctrine. See Haman v. Allied Concrete Prods., Inc., 495
P.2d 531 (Alaska 1972); Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby": Maritime Personal-Injury Indem-
nity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1968). In 1972, Congress responded to the criticism
of these decisions and to the inequity giving rise to them by altering the FLHWCA's
exclusive liability provision. See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698. Under the new provisions the vessel is held to a
negligence standard and the shipowner is barred from seeking indemnification from a
concurrently negligent employer. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). For another expression of
support for exclusive liability provisions, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 52 (1972).
41. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(g) (1981).
360 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 5:351
Nonetheless, the court stated that, though the general contrac-
tor is not an employer for purposes of the immunity provision, it
is an employer for purposes of the set-off clause .' Because the
court's justification for excluding the general contractor from the"employer" definition is broadly based on finding legislative
intent to exclude him from that general category, any reasoning
that denies "employer" status for purposes of the immunity pro-
vision yet finds that status for purposes of set-off is inconsistent
and questionable. 4S Applying the court's limited definition con-
sistently, however, results in the employee's collecting and keep-
ing a double recovery.'
The Miller court used the contractor-under clause as a "big
stick" to penalize the inattentive contractor for failing to require
his subcontractor to carry compensation coverage. The court's
decision implies that granting tort immunity to the general con-
tractor would not only cause fewer subcontractors to insure, 4
but would also reward general contractors for failure to police
their subcontractors by freeing them from tort liability on
account of the injury." Such a result would be contrary to the
policy of the contractor-under clause.47
This reasoning, however, fails in two respects. First, the the-
42. The court stated: "If the general contractor is found liable for damages at com-
mon law, he may also set-off from that award the amount of compensation benefits he
has previously paid to the subcontractor's employee." 629 P.2d at 1391.
43. Other provisions of the Act rely on the employer status. For example, the Act
imposes sanctions on the employer who fails to insure, and keep insured, employees cov-
ered by the Act. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.075(b) (1981). Because the Act only provides for
the noncomplying employer, under the Miller holding no sanctions exist against the non-
complying general contractor.
44. All jurisdictions allowing third-party actions unanimously prohibit double recov-
ery. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.21, at 14-4 (1976). However
unlikely it is that the Alaska court will allow that result, the court will only have equity
at the price of additional confusion. See generally 2A id. § 71.
45. This argument has particular appeal where the relative financial positions of the
general contractor and subcontractor are considered. If the subcontractor is undercapi-
talized or financially weak (i.e., judgment proof) the general contractor could easily dis-
courage the subcontractor from providing compensation coverage. Since the subcontrac-
tor has no incentive to carry compensation coverage, the general contractor could assume
the responsibility for coverage and thereby render himself immune from common law
actions. Faced with pursuing a judgment proof employer or accepting compensation, the
employee would likely accept the swift and sure compensation. As discussed below, how-
ever, the argument relies on questionable assumptions. See infra notes 49-52 and accom-
panying text.
46. See Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill.2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976); 2A A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 146-47 (Supp. 1981).
47. See IC A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 49.11, at 9-12 (1980).
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ory erroneously assumes that the general contractor is in a bet-
ter financial or legal position with compensation liability and the
immunity provision than without them. The assumption ignores
the balancing interests underlying compensation acts in general,
for where an act burdens the employer with liability regardless
of fault, it benefits the employee with swift and certain compen-
sation. And where an act benefits the employer with immunity,
it burdens the employee with the abrogation of potentially
greater recovery in an independent action. 8 If the balance is
tipped, imposing liability too onerous on the employer, or pro-
viding insignificant compensation to the employee, the validity
of the Act becomes doubtful.4 Thus, the balance struck neither
favors nor substantially benefits either side.
Second, it is unreasonable to assume that a contractor will
find incentive to elect absolute liability in all cases simply to
protect himself from the remote possibility of a personal injury
award.50 The liability the general contractor assumes under the
Act when employing an uninsured subcontractor arises in all
work related injury cases, not merely those in which the contrac-
tor negligently caused the worker's injury.5e The general contrac-
tor effectively assumes liability for the negligence of all individu-
als, including the employee, though relieving himself from
liability only for his own negligence. While that choice may ben-
efit the contractor in the context of a single case, over time the
benefits and burdens balance.6" Therefore, the court's implicit
48. Generally, a contractor is not liable for either the negligence of the subcontrac-
tor or injury to the subcontractor's employee and does not assume a duty of care to the
latter. Everette v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 614 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1980); Morris v.
City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1976). The major exception to this rule is where
the contractor retains control over the work. The contractor is liable for the harmful
consequences following from negligent exercise of that responsibility. Everette, 614 P.2d
at 1347.
49. See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 452-53 (1918) (McReyn-
olds, J., dissenting); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 205 (1917); Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1916).
50. In Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill.2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976), a
strong dissent stated:
Under the above-mentioned rule, however, the contractor does not exchange
immunity from a single personal injury action for responsibility for a single
compensation claim. Rather, the general contractor is required to accept abso-
lute compensation liability for all injuries of all employees of the uninsured
subcontractor in order to gain this immunity.
Id. at 449, 359 N.E.2d at 131 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
51. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.045(b) (1981).
52. In a recent study, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
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reasoning-that allowing immunity concurrent with applying
the contractor-under clause would undermine the effectiveness
of the clause-is unfounded.
With the Miller ruling, the Alaska court aligns itself against
the majority of jurisdictions whose workers' compensation acts
contain contractor-under clauses." The majority of states hold
the general contractor immune when he is, under the existing
facts, subject to liability for compensation." The majority rule
recognizes that the contractor assuming primary responsibility
for paying compensation stands in the employer's shoes for pur-
poses of the Act.'8 The minority trend within the majority rule
is towards broadening the existing grant of immunity to cover
contractors that are merely potentially liable for compensation."
Courts support this latter rule on the practical theory that, in
the end, the contractor bears the cost of compensation and
'should realize the benefit of the expenditure.57
Perry v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc." provides an approach
Laws indicated that failing to impose a workers' compensation scheme and instead sub-
jecting the employer to negligence actions is an inferior alternative for employees. The
Commission recognized that, though negligence suits may be more attractive than they
were 50 years ago, most studies indicate that a substantial proportion of work related
injuries consist of the intermingled responsibility of both employer and employee.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, RmPor 119-20
(1972). See also supra note 49.
53. 629 P.2d at 1390.
54. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.31 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Clements v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 745, 252 S.E.2d 635
(1979); Fonesca v. Pacific Constr. Co., 54 Hawaii 578, 513 P.2d 156 (1973); Mosely v.
Jones, 224 Miss. 725, 80 So. 2d 819 (1955); Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C.
65, 267 S.E.2d 524 (1980). In accordance with these decisions, where the general contrac-
tor's liability to provide compensation never attaches, e.g. when the subcontractor pro-
vides compensation coverage for his employees, courts do not apply the acts' exclusive
liability provision. See Kozoidek v. Gearbulk, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 401 (D. Md. 1979);
Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959); Great W. Sugar
Co. v. Erbes, 148 Colo. 566, 367 P.2d 329 (1961); DiNicola v. George Hyman Constr. Co.,
407 A.2d 670 (D.C. 1979).
56. Courts following the minority trend apply the immunity provision to tort actions
against the general contractor regardless of whether the general contractor has actually
paid the injured worker's compensation or even provided insurance coverage. See, e.g.,
Downing v. Dondlinger & Sons Constr. Co., 294 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Lopez-
Correa v. Marine Nay. Co., 289 F. Supp. 993 (D.P.R. 1968); Hart v. National Airlines,
Inc., 217 So. 2d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 533 (1969); Thibodaux
v. Sun Oil Co., 40 So. 2d 761 (La. Ct. App. 1949), aff'd, 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
57. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.31 at 14-55 to -56 (1976).
58. 202 So. 2d 694 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 251 La. 405, 204 So. 2d 579 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). Cf. Probst v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 379 F.2d 763
(5th Cir. 1967). In Probst the court of appeals specifically declined to address the issue of
whether the general contractor can assert the FLHWCA's exclusive liability provision
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consistent with both the purpose of the Compensation Act and
the purpose of the contractor-under provision. In Perry the Lou-
isiana Court of Appeals applied the Federal Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (FLHWCA) to an injured
worker of an uninsured subcontractor working in navigable
waters." The negligent general contractor asserted that the
employee's exclusive remedy was to seek compensation from the
general contractor under the FLHWCA.60 The court rejected the
argument, finding that immunity arose only after the general
contractor became liable for the compensation required by the
FLHWCA 1 The court interpreted the FLHWCA62 to allow the
injured worker to pursue one of two courses: either seek workers'
compensation benefits from his uninsured employer; or seek
compensation from the general contractor under the Act's con-
tractor-under provision and pursue the employer independently
in tort. If the injured worker elected to seek workers' compensa-
tion from his employer, he then would have the option to pursue
a third-party claim against the general contractor. 3 The immu-
nity, in other words, follows the liability to pay workers' com-
pensation benefits.
The Perry rule provides the most workable option under
Alaska's Compensation Act as well. Under the Perry rule,
where he has in fact paid compensation benefits to the uninsured subcontractor's injured
employee. 379 F.2d at 767. The Probst court, however, did identify the options available
to the injured worker where his uninsured employer negligently caused his injuries. Con-
sistent with Perry, the Probst court said the employee had three available options: assert
a tort claim against the employer, demand compensation payment from the employer, or
demand compensation payment from the general contractor. Id. at 766-67.
59. Plaintiff was the employee of a subcontractor that provided underwater con-
struction services. The subcontractor was engaged by the contractor/defendant to assist
in constructing an underwater tunnel across a navigable river. While under water, plain-
tiff was scooped up by defendant's crane and dropped back into the water. Plaintiff's
employer had secured compensation coverage but it did not become effective until two
days after the injury. 202 So. 2d at 695-97.
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 702. In a recent decision the Florida Court of Appeals interpreted the
FLHWCA's immunity clause contrary to the Perry interpretation. Fiore v. Royal Paint-
ing Co., 398 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The Fiore court found that the design
of the FLHWCA is to protect the injured employee, not the general contractor. Id. at
865. Therefore, the court held that the general contractor who paid compensation to the
subcontractor's injured employee is not immune from subsequent claims against him as a
third party. Id. Because the reasoning in Fiore is substantially the same as that in
Miller, detailed discussion of the Florida decision is not provided in this casenote. How-
ever, the analysis applied to Miller is applicable to Fiore.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 905(A) (1976).
63. Id.
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Alaska's Act, like the FLHWCA, could provide two preliminary
options to the uninsured subcontractor's employee. First, the
employee could elect to pursue the subcontractor, his primary
employer, for compensation under the Act." If the employee
elects this option, the primary employer would be able to assert
the exclusive liability defense as a bar to any subsequent actions
by the employee on account of the same injuries. If the general
contractor was a party to causing the injury, the injured worker
would be free to pursue him as a third-party tort feasor." Since
the contractor was not required to pay compensation under the
Act, he could not claim immunity under the exclusive liability
provision.6
Second, the employee could elect to claim compensation
from the general contractor as statutory employer according to
the Act's contractor-under provision. Assuming the worker's pri-
mary employer was negligent, the injured worker would claim
damages from him in an independent tort action. The general
contractor, made liable as the statutory employer for the
worker's compensation benefits, could avail itself of the Act's
exclusive liability provision. The primary employer, having
failed to secure the compensation and not being subjected to lia-
bility for it, relinquishes the exclusive liability defense and
potentially faces judgment in tort.67
The Perry rule has many advantages. First, the rule puts all
parties on an equal footing. It subjects neither the subcontractor
nor the general contractor to both compensation payment under
the Act and independent liability for damages. Moreover, under
64. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981). See supra note 7.
65. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015 (1981 & Supp. 1981).
66. The rule in Perry is consistent with those decisions interpreting the general con-
tractor's ability to assert the FLHWCA's exclusive liability provision in defense of a
claim by an injured worker of an insured subcontractor. Here, the general contractor
faces only a potential for compensation liability. Courts addressing the issue hold that,
since the subcontractor met the statutory obligation to secure compensation coverage for
his employees, the general contractor's mere potential liability under the FLHWCA is
not a sufficient burden to justify conferring the full benefit of the Act's immunity provi-
sion. As with the Perry rule, where liability does not in fact exist, the immunity provi-
sion cannot be asserted. The injured employee is, therefore, free to assert a third party
action against the general contractor. Kozoidek v. Gearbulk, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 401 (D.
Md. 1979); Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959); Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Constr. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951); DiNicola v.
George Hyman Constr. Co., 407 A.2d 670 (D.C. 1979). These applications of the exclusive
liability provision are also consistent with the majority of courts interpreting state work-
ers' compensation acts. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1981).
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the Perry rule the injured worker can choose the path most
likely to produce fruitful results. The path would normally lead
to seeking a tort judgment against the deepest pocket providing
the greatest potential for recovery, and seeking worker's com-
pensation benefits from the other party."8
Second, the Perry rule furthers the Act's underlying policy.
Only the party assuming the Act's absolute liability for compen-
sation receives the benefit of the exclusive liability provision.
This benefit attaches without eliminating the general contrac-
tor's incentive to police the subcontractor to assure that the sub-
contractor provides compensation coverage. The contractor still
faces the possibility of absolute liability for compensation pay-
ment irrespective of his own culpability.
Finally, the Perry rule accomplishes these results without
straining the words of the Act. Under this rule the court must
read the Act's exclusive liability provision in pari materia with
the Act's overall compensation scheme. For immunity purposes,
the rule requires finding that the key element in the "employer"
definition is the duty to pay worker's compensation benefits,
rather than participation in the primary employment relation-
ship. Then, when the general contractor must pay those benefits,
the immunity provision attaches to bar further liability.
In Miller the Alaska Supreme Court incorrectly refused to
read the "employer" definition broadly enough to encompass the
compensation paying general contractor, unfairly subjecting the
contractor to both statutory and tort liability. The court disre-
garded its previously acknowledged responsibility to construe
the terms of the Act in light of the Act's underlying policy. The
court rested its summary conclusion on the questionable finding
that the legislature, through the Act's words and history, did not
manifest an intent to include the general contractor, liable
68. Where the injury to the employee results from the negligence of only one party,
the injured employee more likely will choose to pursue that party on a tort theory, thus
having the potential for providing the largest award. He will pursue the other party to
recover the compensation payments. Where both the contractor and the subcontractor
are joint tort feasors, the employee most likely will seek the "deep pocket" for the dam-
ages claim. Thus, the contractor and subcontractor are in no worse position vis-a-vis
each other while the injured employee has the benefit of choice in determining where his
remedies lie. The rule, however, breaks down where either the contractor or subcontrac-
tor is insolvent or otherwise judgment proof. The injured worker is then faced with the
dilemma of accepting the certain but smaller compensation award from the solvent party
or pursuing a damage claim against that party, with the potential risk of no recovery.
One possible solution is to read the Act as not precluding a claim for compensation fol-
lowing an unsuccessful claim for damages from the solvent party.
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according to the contractor-under clause, within the Act's exclu-
sive liability provision. The result is treatment regardless of the
equities, and construction of the Act's provisions in a manner
that adds confusion. A more equitable approach would allow the
"employer" status to follow the obligation to make compensa-
tion payments. Under this approach the injured worker is
assured the compensation benefits without abrogating his third-
party cause of action. At the same time neither the general con-
tractor nor the subcontractor bears the burden of both claims.
The result is a proper allocation of the burdens and benefits of
the compensation scheme.
Timothy R. Gosselin
